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1957]

RECENT CASES

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS -

BILLBOARDS -

ZONING ORDINANCE

PROHIBITING BILLBOARDS EXCEPTS THOSE ADVERTISING BUSINESS CON-

Plaintiff, an outdoor advertising company, leased the roof above a drugstore. The Zoning Division refused him a permit to erect on the leased premises a billboard for
general advertising purposes because it was not an accessory use'
incidental to the business conducted on the premises, and in addition the public health, safety, morals and welfare would be affected.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, one justice dissenting, reversed the Court of Common Pleas and held, that a billboard is not an accessory use unless it advertises the business conducted thereon. Landau Advertising Co. v. Zoning Board of Adjustiment, 387 Pa. 552, 128 A.2d 559 (1957).
Ordinances and zoning ordinances that prohibit, 2 and regulate
the location,a safety,4 height,, size,6 and esthetic aspects7 of billboards have been held a valid exercise of the police power. But
since such regulations and prohibitions of private property are a
derogation of common law property rights,8 the power to regulate
billboards is not unlimited; 9 the prohibitions must be reasonable
and must have a substantial relation to the public health, safety,
morals and welfare.- ° The reasonableness of the regulations is the
1
test of their legality." Each case must be decided on its own facts.
Merely because the regulation is said to be salutary to, the public
health, safety, morals and welfare does not permit meddlesomeness.1"
The courts make a distinction between billboard ordinances as
such and billboard ordinances which are part of a comprehensive
DUCTED

ON

THE

PREMISES.-

1. (The zoning ordinance sets forth uses allowed in "A" Commercial districts and
though billboards are not included accessory uses thereof are permitted).
2. Murphy Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); Gen"eral Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 290 Mass. 149, 193 N.E.
799 (1935).
3. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, supra note 2;
Appeal of Liggett, 291 Pa. 109, 139 At. 619 (1927).
4. Anderson v. Shackelford, 74 Fla. 36, 76 So. 343 (1917); City of Passaic v.
Paterson Billposting Co., 71 N.J. 75, 58 Al. 343 (1904).
5. Murphy Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); City
of Rochester v. West, 164 N.Y. 510, 58 N.E. 673 (1900),
6. Cusack Co. v. Chicago, 242 U.S. 526 (1917); Gunning Advertisement Co. v.
St. Louis, 235 Mo. 99, 137 S.W. 929 (1911).
7. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Department of Public Works, 289 Mass. 149,
193 N.E. 799 (1935).
8. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.72 (3d ed. 1950).
9. State v. Whitlock, 149 N. C. 542, 63 S.E. 123 (1908).
10. General Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Indianapolis, 202 Ind.85, 172 N.E. 309
(1930).
11. Moreland v. Armstrong, 297 Mich. 32, 297 N.W. 60 (1941).
12. See Pere Marquette Ry. Co. v. Muskegon Township, 298 Mich. 31, 298 N.W.
393 (1941).
13. Appeal of White, 287 Pa. 259, 134 At. 409 (1926).
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zoning plan. 1 The tendency is to strike down the former" and
uphold the latter. 16 In O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising Co. v.
Borough of Rutherford 17 an ordinance prohibiting billboards except
on premises where the business advertised is conducted was held
invalid as an unreasonable exercise of the police power. However,
in United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan a zoning ordinance with similar provisions to that of the O'Mealia case, supra,
was held reasonable in that it minimizes "the abuses and hazards
incident to the use of such signs". 18
It appears that the general trend of the court's decisions is to
liberally construe regulations that restrict the use of private property 9 because of the changing needs of changing times,2" and to
uphold regulations which formerly would have been arbitrary, unreasonable and unconstitutional."l But it should be noted that even
the courts that construe such regulations liberally recognize that
22
the ordinance must be reasonably related to the public welfare.
The public must obtain a benefit at least equal to the onus placed
on private property."
It is submitted that the position taken by the dissent in the instant case, that the regulation was unreasonable and arbitrary,2 4 is
the sounder view. The advertising matter on the billboard was
made the test. If billboards are permitted, the advertising thereon
14. See Murphy Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944).
2 Yokley, Zoning § 217 (2d ed. 1953).
15. See Varney and Green v. Williams, 155 Cal. 318, 100 Pac. 867 (1909);
O'Mealia Outdoor Advertising Co. v. Borough of Rutherford, 128 N. J. L. 587, 27 A.2d
803 (-Sup. Ct. 1942); Mid-State Advertising Corp. v. Bond, 274 N.Y.82, 8 N.E.2d
286 (1937); People v. Wolf, 127 Misc. 382, 216 N.Y.S. 741 (Nassau County Ct.
1926); ci. People ex rel. Wineburgh Advertising.Co. v. Murphy, 195 N.Y. 126, 88 N.E.
17 (1909); but see 1 Hetzenbaum, Zoning, c. VI-f. (2d.ed...1955), who states-that People
ex. rel. Publicity Listing Co. v. Dudwig, 218 N.Y. 540, 113 N.E. 532 (1916) in an attempt to distinguish between the two cases overruled the Wineburgh case. by a judicial
courtesy.
16. See Murphy Inc. v. Town of Westport, .131. Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944);
Criterion Service Inc. v. East Cleveland, 88 N.E.2d 300 (Ohio 1949); United Advertising Corp. v. Borough of Raritan, 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
17. 128 N.J. L. 587, 27 A.2d 863 (Sup. Ct. 1942).
18. 11 N.J. 144, 93 A.2d 362 (1952).
19. Murphy Inc. v. Town of Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 40 A.2d 177 (1944); See
(Zoning
Midgarden v. City of Grand Forks, 79 N.D.18, 54 N.W.2d 659 (1952)
ordinance that prohibits trailer homes in a residential zone held valid though plaintiff's
premises were subject to floods and were grenerally nqt suitable to permanent dwellings.);
,a strict construction. 8 McQuillian
8 McQuillin supra § 25.73. But some courts adhere tOF
supra § 25.72 (In Missouri strict construction was abolished in 1917. 8 McQuillin supra
§ 25.72, n. 72).
20. Murphy Inc. v. Town of Westport, supra note 19; 8 McQuillin, supra note 19.
21. State ex rel. Beery v. Houghton, 164 Mim.. 146, 204 N.W. 569 (1925).
22. 8 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations § 25.73 (3d ed. 1950).
23. West Hartford Methodist Church v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 143 Conn. 263,
121 A.2d 640 (1956).
24. 128 A.2d at 564 (The dissenting justice indicated that the owner of the drugstore could construct a billboard of the size in question if it advertised the drugstore or
any article sold therein. The sign could read, "Buy Old Grandad Below and Live to be
Eighty", but it could not read, "Drive Safely and Live Longer").
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should not be prohibited unless it is contrary to good morals or
against public policy. There is difficulty in discerning the difference
between advertising the business of the occupier or the business of
another; it may be a distinction without a difference. It is not the
letter, word or model that endangers the public; it is the structure
upon which it is attached that may be dangerous.2 5 The ordinance
in the instant case permits one type of advertising and forbids
another; it does not promote the public health, safety, morals and
2
welfare and it does not remedy an existing evil,' "
JOHN M. ORBAN.

PROCESS -

SERVICE UPON NONRESIDENT MOTORIST -

INTERPRETA-

A filling station attendant brought
an action against a nonresident motorist to recover for scalds and
burns suffered while servicing the motorist's automobile at a gasoline service station. The Circuit Court of Arkansas entered an
order sustaining motion to quash service and the attendant appealed. The Supreme Court of Arkansas held, that the nonresident
motorist was not amenable to substituted service of process in the
state under the Nonresident Motorist Statute' since the alleged
cause of action arose out of an accident which occurred upon private property and not upon the public highway as the statute expressly requires. 2 Langley v. Bunn, 284 S.W.2d 319 (Ark. 1955).
The constitutionality of states' regulation of nonresident motorists
as a police power has long been decided and is not an issue in this
case.' The issue is the interpretation of the wording of the statutes
by the courts. Nonresident' service statutes have been interpreted
both strictly4 and liberally. 5 However the majority of courts have
TION OF APPLICABLE STATUTE.

-

25. People ex rel. Wineburgh Advertising Co. v. Murphy, 195 N. Y. 126, 88 N.E.
17 (1909).
26. People v. Wolf, 127 Misc. 382, N.Y.S. (Nassau County Ct. 1926) (ordinance that prohibited signboards on vacant lots except to advertise the sale of such lot held

invalid.).
1. Ark.

Stat. Ann.,

§ 27-342.1

(1955)

"The

acceptance

by

a

nonresident

owner of the rights and privileges to drive or operate a motor vehicle upon the public
highway of this State shall be deemed equivalent to the appointment of the Secretary of
the State of Arkansas to be the true and lawful attorney and agent of such nonresident
upon whom may be served all lawful process in any action growing out of accident or
collision in which said nonresident may be involved while operating a motor vehicle on
such highway."

2. Ark.

Stat.

Ann.,

§ 27-341.1

(1953)

"Any

public

highway

within

the

borders of the State of Arkansas including byways, county highways, State highways, roads
or highways in national parks and roads or highways in military reservations whether used
conditionally or unconditionally by the public."

3.
(1936);
4.
5.
(1941).

Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13; Kelso v. Bush, 191 Ark. 1044, 89 S.W.2d 594
Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 144 N.E. 760 (1924).
Kelley v. Koetting, 164 Kan. 542, 190 P.2d 361 (1948).
Gallagher v. Dist. Court of 6th Judicial Diet., 112 Mont. 253, 114 P.2d 1047

